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I’LL TAKE “IMPROPER DECLARATIONS OF MISTRIAL” 
FOR $2,000.00: 
APPLYING THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT 
Robar v. LaBuda1 
(decided April 28, 2011) 
I. THE MATTER OF ROBAR V. LABUDA 
The petitioner, a hunter from Lumberton, New York, faced re-
trial following the declaration of a mistrial at the county court.2  The 
petitioner sought a motion to stay retrial in order to seek “a writ of 
prohibition [which would] preclud[e] a retrial on the criminal 
charges” against the petitioner on the grounds of double jeopardy.3  
Pursuant to one‟s rights under both the United States and New York 
State Constitutions, a person shall not be placed in jeopardy more 
than once for the same offense.4  The Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, granted the petitioner‟s motion, pending review by special 
proceeding.5  Upon review, the court, citing relevant statutory and 
case law, ruled in favor of the petitioner, subsequently granted his pe-
tition, and held that retrial is precluded under the principle of double 
jeopardy.6 
The petitioner in this matter was originally “charged . . . with 
the crimes of assault in the second degree and reckless endangerment 
 
1 921 N.Y.S.2d 710 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 2011). 
2 Id. at 713-15. 
3 Id. at 715; see also N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6 (“No person shall be subject to be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense . . . .”). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
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in the second degree,” stemming from an incident which occurred on 
his property in which another hunter was mistakenly shot and injured 
by the petitioner.7  At voir dire, defense counsel exercised a series of 
peremptory challenges to remove five hunters from serving as jurors.8  
The prosecution objected to these challenges, claiming that the hunt-
ers were inappropriately struck pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky9 and 
its progeny.10  The county court allowed the challenges and excused 
the challenged jurors, but reserved its right to decide on the propriety 
of the Batson challenges.11  After another juror was struck on a see-
mingly similar basis, the prosecution objected a second time, to 
which the court responded in the same manner as before.12  Follow-
ing the completion of jury selection, “the court continued to reserve 
decision” on the Batson arguments.13 
After the prosecution presented its case and rested, the peti-
tioner in this matter presented his testimony.14  The court then ex-
cused the jury in order to contemplate mistrial for an unrelated is-
sue.15  The following day, the prosecution agreed with the court that 
“a mistrial was necessary” and reasserted its Batson argument, which 
was yet again reserved for decision by the court.16  Later that day, the 
prosecution sent a letter to the court “asserting that they were not 
seeking a mistrial,” and the defense similarly faxed a letter to the 
court stating that it was distinctly opposed to a mistrial.17  The fol-
lowing day, the court ruled that petitioner‟s counsel violated the rule 
of law in Batson, and subsequent cases, by using its peremptory chal-
lenges to remove jurors who belonged to a constitutionally-protected 
class.18  Without regard to the letters from both parties concerning a 
 
7 Id. at 713-14; see People v. Robar, 907 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (Sullivan Cnty. Ct. 2010). 
8 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 714.  For a discussion regarding the facts and reasoning of the 
lower court‟s decision, see Andrew W. Koster, Note, People v. Robar, 27 TOURO L. REV. 
885 (2011). 
9 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
10 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 714. 





15 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 714. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 714-15 (explaining that hunters exercise their fundamental right to bear arms, 
2
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mistrial, the court decided in favor of the prosecution and declared 
that a mistrial was the only proper “ „cure‟ for [such a] violation.”19 
Following this decision, the petitioner commenced a new pro-
ceeding against the respondent, the County Judge of Sullivan County, 
in order to seek a writ of prohibition in order to preclude retrial on the 
grounds of double jeopardy.20  In reaching its ultimate decision to 
grant the defendant‟s petition, the court relied heavily on both estab-
lished case law as well as statutory prohibitions against retrial as 
found in both the United States and New York Constitutions.21 
In order for retrial to be an acceptable remedy for an inappro-
priate action taken by the prosecution to which the defendant objects, 
the court looked to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution22 and the seminal federal court case on double jeopardy, United 
States v. Perez,23 for guidance.24  The Constitution reads that no per-
son may be subjected to jeopardy of life or limb twice for the same 
offense.25  Therefore, where jeopardy has attached, the retrial of a 
case is constitutionally barred, save a few exceptions.26  For example, 
in such matters where the defendant does not consent to mistrial, the 
court acknowledged that retrial is prohibited “unless „there is a ma-
nifest necessity for [the mistrial], or the ends of public justice would 
otherwise be defeated,‟ ” as set forth in Perez.27  For there to exist a 
“manifest necessity” warranting a mistrial and retrial without the 
consent of the defendant, there must be a situation in which justice 
would otherwise be defeated if the defendant was not subjected to a 
subsequent retrial.28  The Supreme Court has also traditionally quali-
fied “manifest necessity” as a situation in which there exists a “high 
 
which is protected by the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution). 
19 Id.  
20 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
21 Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
23 22 U.S. 579 (1824). 
24 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16. 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
26 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16. 
27 Id. at 716 (quoting Perez, 22 U.S. at 580). 
28 Id. at 717 (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1978) (explaining that, 
in certain occasions, the defendant‟s right to have his case tried before the first jury impa-
neled “is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full 
and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury”)). 
3
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degree” of need justifying retrial.29  In Robar, the Appellate Division, 
Third Department, determined that the trial court failed to establish a 
“manifest necessity,” and therefore abused its discretion requiring the 
declaration of mistrial and subsequent retrial of the matter.30 
In the event the court could find that the defendant somehow 
agreed to a mistrial, the court would then need to determine whether 
the defendant did so in response to improper actions on the part of the 
prosecution, or the court itself.31  Traditionally, where a defendant 
declares or consents to a mistrial, courts have rejected the application 
of a double jeopardy analysis.32  The court in Robar acknowledged, 
as does the Supreme Court, that there exists an exception which al-
lows the defendant to raise the bar of double jeopardy, when it is 
found that the actions of the prosecution or court improperly 
“goad[ed] the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.”33  In Robar, the 
court emphasized that defense counsel unequivocally objected and 
did not consent to a mistrial.34  Because the petitioner blatantly ob-
jected to a declaration of mistrial, retrial would be barred without a 
showing of “manifest necessity,” which the court here noted, is lack-
ing.35 
The court in Robar also applied the holdings of Batson and its 
progeny in determining whether or not the review of the Batson chal-
lenges constituted a sufficient ground for declaring a mistrial.36  
While the approach taken by the county court determined that the 
hunters made up a protected class under Batson, the appellate court 
rejected this view.37  There is no codified requirement that “the 
„jur[y] actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the 
 
29 Id. (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 506). 
30 Id. 
31 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 716. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 716-17. 
36 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (holding that a manifest necessity did not exist for retrial 
on the basis of a violation of the jurors‟ constitutional rights). 
37 Id. at 718 (emphasis in original) (“The fact that hunters may exercise their Second 
Amendment right—a right certainly not limited to hunters or conferred upon them because 
they are hunters—does not morph them into a cognizable group for equal protection purpos-
es.”); see also Koster, supra note 8, at 888 (discussing the lower court‟s finding of a “ „Bat-
son-„like‟ violation‟ in the defendant‟s removal of licensed hunters”). 
4
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various distinctive groups in the population.‟ ”38  Furthermore, the 
court held that the declaration of mistrial and subsequent retrial is an 
improper approach to a Batson violation, as other more appropriate 
remedies exist.39 
The court also noted that Batson challenges are typically ar-
gued and decided prior to the swearing in of a jury and require the sa-
tisfaction of a three-prong analysis, as outlined in Batson and its 
progeny.40  All remedies for a Batson violation, such as “granting the 
nonoffending [sic] party additional peremptory challenges, or forfei-
ture of the peremptory challenges used [improperly]” cease to exist 
upon the swearing in of the jury.41  Once the jury is impaneled, any 
viable remedies for the improper use of peremptory challenges under 
these cases are gone, and the court may not look to mistrial as a 
means of rectifying such a situation under the guise of “manifest ne-
cessity” existing to do so.42  While an exception to this rule exists, it 
only applies when the defendant moves for mistrial for the prosecu-
tion‟s improper use of Batson challenges, which was not applicable 
in Robar.43 
The court in Robar focused upon the notion, as previously es-
tablished by the Court of Appeals in People v. Michael,44 that the 
“prohibition against double jeopardy is fundamental not only to the 
process of criminal justice, but to our system of government itself.”45  
 
38 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). 
39 Id. at 719-20 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24 (stating that the judge should deter-
mine “whether it is more appropriate . . . for the trial court to discharge the venire and select 
a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case . . . or to disallow the discri-
minatory challenges”)). 
40 Id. at 720.  The three-prong analysis requires that: 
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor 
has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.  Second, if the 
requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to 
articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.  
Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried 
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991) (citations omitted). 
41 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20 (citing People v. Luciano, 890 N.E.2d 214, 219 (N.Y. 
2008)). 
42 Id. at 720. 
43 Id. 
44 394 N.E.2d 1134 (N.Y. 1979). 
45 Id. at 1136 (stating that the constitutional bar against double jeopardy “serves as an im-
portant check on the potential power of the State”). 
5
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The court in Robar, as noted previously, determined that the petition-
er did not consent to a mistrial, and therefore did not waive his fun-
damental right to the protection against double jeopardy.46  Because 
the defendant did not waive his protection against double jeopardy, 
the court deferred to the state constitution for guidance on whether to 
grant the defendant‟s petition.47  The New York State Constitution 
stresses the inherent fundamental status of one‟s protection against 
standing trial for the same crime twice without consent.48  The court 
applied this concept when it granted the defendant‟s petition.49 
The court also noted that the defendant retains the right to be 
free from reprosecution of a matter in the event that the first trial had 
not reached a conclusion.50  Here, the petitioner was subjected to a 
trial in which a jury was sworn in and heard the prosecution‟s argu-
ments and part of the defendant‟s testimony.51  The court, in compar-
ing this situation to that of the defendant in People v. Baptiste,52 em-
phasized that a defendant has a significant interest in having the jury 
render a verdict following the first attachment of jeopardy, barring a 
deadlock or some other inability of that jury to reach said verdict.53  
Because the petitioner in Robar had a “valued right” to have his case 
decided by the original jury “on the first presentation of the evi-
dence,” the court held that the county court judge should not have de-
clared a mistrial and allowed the trial to continue regardless of the ef-
fect of the Batson challenges on the resulting jury.54 
The court also recognized that the reasons for the grant of mi-
strial must be plain and clear, and in no way illusory or deceptive.55  
In order for the trial court to conclude that a mistrial is necessary, it 
 
46 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17. 
47 Id. at 715 (stating that “a defense against prosecution premised upon constitutional 
double jeopardy principles poses a question of law” to be determined by the court in accor-
dance with constitutional provisions). 
48 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
49 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
50 Id. at 715-16. 
51 Id. at 714. 
52 530 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1988). 
53 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16 (referencing Baptiste, 530 N.E.2d at 380). 
54 Id. at 716, 720. 
55 Id. at 717 (citing Matter of Enright v. Siedlecki, 451 N.E.2d 176, 180 (N.Y. 1983) 
(“The reasons underlying the grant of a mistrial may not be illusory; rather, in order fully to 
protect the defendant‟s right to trial by a particular tribunal they must be necessitous, actual 
and substantial.”)). 
6
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falls upon the trial judge to use his or her discretion in determining 
whether or not the burden of a “manifest necessity” has been 
reached.56  The court in Robar held that the trial court judge abused 
his discretion when he improperly granted a mistrial against the 
wishes of the defendant and “without considering alternatives.”57  
Due to such an abuse of discretion, the retrial was therefore barred.58 
In a unanimous decision, the Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, held in Robar that there was no existence of “manifest ne-
cessity” warranting a mistrial, and that “retrial of [the] petitioner is 
barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy.”59  Because retrial 
is not permitted on the same offense and the first trial was improperly 
concluded by the judge‟s declaration of mistrial, the indictment 
against the petitioner was dismissed and the petitioner may no longer 
be tried on the charges contained in the original indictment.60 
 
II. FEDERAL APPROACH TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
The Supreme Court of the United States has traditionally fol-
lowed the holding of United States v. Perez when analyzing double 
jeopardy.61  The Court in Perez considered whether the discharge of 
the jury prior to issuing a verdict and without consent is grounds for a 
bar to retrial of the matter.62  Because no verdict had been reached, 
the defendant explained that he had a fundamental right as protected 
by the Constitution to be released from custody.63  Justice Story, deli-
vering the opinion of the Court, noted that the courts of the United 
States are endowed “with the authority to discharge a jury from giv-
ing any verdict . . . [where] there is a manifest necessity for the act, or 
 
56 See Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 180-81 (stating that trial judge may grant a mistrial when no 
other adequate alternative exists, and where there is a manifest necessity to do so). 
57 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 717 (citing Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 180). 
58 Id. at 717, 720. 
59 Id. at 720 (holding that a manifest necessity for retrial must exist, more specifically in 
situations where the defendant gave no consent to mistrial and did not waive his protection 
from double jeopardy). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 716. 
62 Perez, 22 U.S. at 579 (explaining that the jury, being unable to reach a verdict, was dis-
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the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”64  The Court, 
therefore, has the discretion to interfere with traditional judicial pro-
cedure, where there is a high degree of need to do so, in pursuit of a 
greater justice.65  The Court highlighted the fact that it would be im-
possible to discern every situation that would satisfy the “manifest 
necessity” standard.66  It did note, however, that future judges and 
courts would need to exercise substantial care when interfering with 
matters, such as these, that are subject to extreme scrutiny under the 
protections of the Constitution.67 
The Perez opinion has long been applied in actions involving 
questions of double jeopardy.  Since Perez, the Court has held that 
retrial by a second jury may be allowed in matters where the first jury 
was “discharged without reaching a verdict and without the defen-
dant‟s consent.”68  In Downum v. United States,69 the prosecutor re-
quested to have the jury discharged after being sworn in due to the 
fact that one of the prosecution‟s key witnesses on a number of the 
counts was not present.70  The defendant moved to have those counts 
at issue dismissed and to continue with trial on the remaining counts, 
to which the trial judge responded with a denial and then proceeded 
to discharge the jury.71  After being found guilty, the defendant ap-
pealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed.72  Upon grant of certiorari, 
the Supreme Court applied the standards from Perez and its progeny, 
and, in its opinion, explained that the prosecution “t[akes] a chance” 
when it impanels the jury “without first ascertaining whether or not 
its witnesses were present.”73  In determining whether there was a vi-
olation of the protection against double jeopardy as stated in the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Court held that any 
doubt should be resolved “in favor of the liberty of the citizen, rather 
 
64 Id. at 580. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (stating that “it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it 
proper to interfere” with a defendant‟s constitutional protection against double jeopardy). 
67 Perez, 22 U.S. at 580. 
68 Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1963) (citing Perez, 22 U.S. at 579 
(“[T]he jury, being unable to agree, were discharged by the Court from giving any verdict 
upon the indictment, without the consent of the prisoner . . . .”)). 
69 372 U.S. 734 (1963).  
70 Id. at 735. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 737 (quoting Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1931)). 
8
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than exercise what would be an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary 
judicial discretion.”74  The Court here expounded upon and qualified 
Justice Story‟s concept of “manifest necessity,” denoting that in all 
double jeopardy matters where judicial discretion may be abused, the 
Court should defer to what is most favorable to the defendant‟s liber-
ty.75 
In United States v. Dinitz,76 the Court examined whether a mi-
strial requested by the defendant, due to an error on the part of the 
judge or prosecution, bars reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Constitution.77  Unlike the previous cases on this mat-
ter, where the defendant objected to or did not consent to retrial, Di-
nitz was the first time the Supreme Court directly dealt with the issue 
of a defendant who requested a mistrial, but argued that retrial should 
be barred under double jeopardy.78  Traditionally, a defendant‟s mo-
tion for mistrial is “assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecu-
tion.”79  In its opinion the Court stated that, because the trial court did 
not act in bad faith when it removed defendant‟s counsel due to im-
proper conduct, this action cannot be seen to have been intended to 
“provoke mistrial requests and thereby subject defendants to the sub-
stantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions.”80  Because the 
defendant would not be subjected to an undue burden by the retrial of 
his matter, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar 
reprosecution of the defendant.81 
In Arizona v. Washington,82 the Court again evaluated the re-
quirement for “manifest necessity” where there is gross misconduct 
that would cause the jury to improperly favor one party over the oth-
 
74 Downum, 372 U.S. at 737. 
75 Id. at 738; see also Perez, 22 U.S. at 580 (“Courts should be extremely careful how they 
interfere with any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner.”). 
76 424 U.S. 600 (1975). 
77 Id. at 605-06. 
78 Id. at 607. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 611 (stating that defense counsel‟s removal on the basis of his improper state-
ments during opening arguments was not done in order to provoke defendant to move for a 
mistrial). 
81 Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 612; see id. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referencing United 
States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53, 61 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasizing the need for the Court to agree 
with the panel hearing and look back to Justice Story‟s language that a “manifest necessity” 
be present in order to merit retrial without violating the constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy)). 
82 434 U.S. 497 (1978). 
9
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er.83  In this matter, the defendant was found guilty of murder, but 
was later granted a new trial due to the withholding of exculpatory 
evidence on the part of the prosecution.84  At the opening of the 
second trial, defense counsel made inappropriate comments regarding 
the prosecution‟s previous failure to disclose evidence.85  The prose-
cution responded with a motion for mistrial which was eventually 
granted by the trial judge.86  The defendant subsequently filed a writ 
of habeas corpus with the district court, which was granted on the ba-
sis that the trial judge inappropriately granted a mistrial absent an ex-
plicit finding of “manifest necessity.”87  Upon review by the Supreme 
Court, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit‟s decision, explaining that 
explicit use of the term “manifest necessity” by the trial court is not 
requisite in finding that such a degree of necessity has been met.88  
Further, the Court stated that the judge does not bear a burden to dis-
close “on the record all the factors which informed the deliberate ex-
ercise of his discretion.”89 
The issue of prosecutorial misconduct as grounds for a defen-
dant‟s request for mistrial and subsequent barring of retrial under 
double jeopardy, as argued in Dinitz, was again brought before the 
Court in Oregon v. Kennedy.90  The Court in Dinitz noted that an ef-
fort by the prosecution to “goad” the defendant into moving for a mi-
strial may bar reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause.91  In 
Kennedy, the prosecutor, on redirect examination of a witness, re-
ferred to the defendant as “a crook,” which prompted the defense to 
 
83 Id. at 498. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 498-99. 
86 Id. at 499, 501 (stating that, after a series of arguments regarding the motion for mistri-
al, the trial judge granted the motion “based upon defense counsel‟s remarks in his opening 
statement concerning the Arizona Supreme Court opinion”). 
87 Washington, 434 U.S. at 501-03 (stating that the Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that 
the trial judge granted the mistrial without first determining “whether [or not] there could, 
nevertheless, [still] be a fair trial” after the jury heard defense counsel‟s improper remarks). 
88 Id. at 517 (explaining that a trial judge‟s declaration of a mistrial “is not subject to a 
collateral attack in a federal court simply because he failed to find „manifest necessity‟ [by 
using] those [exact] words”). 
89 Id. 
90 456 U.S. 667 (1982); see Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611. 
91 Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611 (stating that reprosecution is barred where the defendant is 
“provoke[d to motion for] a mistrial” by the prosecution‟s error, or the said error is either 
motivated by “bad faith conduct by judge or prosecutor” or undertaken for the purposes of 
“harassment of [the] accused”). 
10
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motion for a mistrial.92  Because the defendant motioned for a mistri-
al, the Court determined that it is not required to show a “manifest 
necessity” for a retrial after the declaration of mistrial.93  In applying 
the Dinitz standard, the Court expressed that when the defendant 
moves for a mistrial in a criminal proceeding, the grounds for barring 
reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy clause are severely li-
mited.94  Because the Court determined that the prosecution in Ken-
nedy did not make its statement for the purposes of eliciting a motion 
for mistrial from the defendant, reprosecution was not barred by the 
Fifth Amendment.95 
 
III. NEW YORK STATE AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Article I, Section Six, of the New York State Constitution, 
like the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, provides 
for the protection of the individual from being tried twice for the 
same offense.96  The courts of the State of New York have interpreted 
the language of the Constitution to establish when reprosecution of a 
matter is barred on the grounds of double jeopardy.  A series of cases 
reached the New York Court of Appeals and appellate departments in 
which the courts have adopted a similar approach to double jeopardy 
as taken by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
In People v. Michael,97 the defendant sought a reversal of his 
conviction at retrial on the grounds of double jeopardy after the orig-
inal trial court “[s]ua sponte declared a mistrial as to defendant Mi-
chael, [both] without obtaining his consent and in the absence of his 
counsel,” in light of the events that occurred during the trial 
process.98  The mistrial was declared shortly after the trial began be-
cause defense counsel was unable to attend due to a death in the 
 
92 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 669. 
93 Id. at 672 (citing Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607-10 (stating that since the defendant moved to 
end the trial by mistrial prior its culmination, a “manifest necessity” application is inapplica-
ble)). 
94 Id. at 679. 
95 Id. 
96 Michael, 394 N.E.2d at 1138 (“[T]he double jeopardy provisions of both our State Con-
stitution and the Federal Constitution prohibit retrial for the same crime [twice]. . . .”). 
97 394 N.E.2d 1134 (N.Y. 1979). 
98 Id. at 1135. 
11
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family.99  The court wished to have the trial completed by the end of 
the same week, but was unable to proceed due to the unavailability of 
defense counsel.100 
Following his conviction at the second trial and the affirming 
of that conviction at the appellate level, the defendant appealed to the 
Court of Appeals, citing a violation of his protection against double 
jeopardy under the state constitution.101  Upon review, the Court of 
Appeals compared and contrasted the facts at bar with those of Perez 
and its New York State counterparts.102  The Court of Appeals ulti-
mately held that a mistrial for the purpose of judicial convenience ab-
sent “manifest necessity” is an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
original trial judge, and, as a result, the conviction of the defendant 
had to be reversed, and the original indictment dismissed.103 
In the Matter of Enright v. Siedlecki,104 the Court of Appeals 
addressed the declaration of a mistrial where the mistrial is based 
upon the unacceptable biasing of the jury by an improper statement 
made by the prosecution.105  This issue was brought before the Court 
of Appeals to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion 
by declaring a mistrial when the prosecution referenced a confession 
given by the defendant subsequent to his request for counsel in its 
statement, and, therefore, created an irreversible bias in the jury.106  
Additionally, defense counsel, during discussion regarding mistrial, 
stated openly that he believed there was no way “the jury could be 
„sanitized‟ with respect to the defendant‟s inculpatory statement,” 
and continued to object to a mistrial.107  While the trial judge agreed 
in part with defense counsel when he stated that “[he did not] see 
 
99 Id. at 1137 (stating that “the court received a phone call from the office of defendant‟s 
attorney, notifying the court that the attorney‟s father had died unexpectedly” a few days af-
ter the start of the trial). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1138. 
102 Michael, 394 N.E.2d at 1138 (discussing the reasoning behind Court of Appeals and 
Supreme Court decisions where retrial has been permitted without violating the constitution-
al protections of the defendant against double jeopardy). 
103 Id. at 1138-39. 
104 451 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1983). 
105 Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 179 (“[D]espite [the judge‟s] instructions to [this] jury [to dis-
regard prosecutor‟s inappropriate remarks], it‟s impossible to unring a bell.”). 
106 Id. at 180 (acknowledging that the trial judge‟s assessment of the circumstances sur-
rounding the declaration of a mistrial should be afforded “the highest degree of respect” 
when being reviewed by an appellate court). 
107 Id. at 178. 
12
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how [the defendant] could get a fair trial with all th[ese issues],” he 
ultimately declared a mistrial.108 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the defense‟s claim of a viola-
tion of the defendant‟s protection against double jeopardy.109  The 
court held that the declaration of a mistrial and subsequent retrial is 
appropriate and constitutional where there is “gross misconduct” on 
the part of the defendant or his counsel, or where it is “impossible to 
proceed [fairly] with the trial” in accordance with applicable law.110  
Therefore, the court determined that the trial judge, in considering the 
inappropriate actions and behaviors of defense counsel and the un-
availability of a key witness, found a “manifest necessity” to declare 
a mistrial and order retrial, and did not abuse his discretion in doing 
so.111 
In People v. Baptiste,112 a mistrial was declared at the first tri-
al when the jury took a substantial period of time to deliberate and 
decide upon a verdict.113  Defense counsel did not consent to a mistri-
al, yet it was granted because, as the trial judge stated, “if they can‟t 
reach a verdict, it has to be a mistrial.”114  In a unanimous decision, 
the Court of Appeals held that there was an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial judge in declaring a mistrial absent a “manifest neces-
sity” to do so.115  The foreman of the jury indicated that there had 
been some movement, but that it may not be able to reach a verdict 
by the deadline set by the court.116  To the Court of Appeals, that 
statement on the record indicated that the jury was still fully capable 
 
108 Id. at 181. 
109 Id. at 178. 
110 Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 179-80 (stating that mistrial is necessary “when it is physically 
impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with law”). 
111 Id. at 181 (“Where, for reasons deemed compelling by the trial judge . . . the ends of 
substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be de-
clared without the defendant‟s consent and even over his objection, and he may be retried 
consistently with the Fifth Amendment.”); id. at 182 (Jones and Simmons, JJ., dissenting) 
(quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 689 (arguing that the majority made an improper deter-
mination to allow the mistrial, and that, as a result, the defendant was being deprived of his 
“valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal”)). 
112 530 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1988). 
113 Id. at 379. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 380-81 (elucidating that there was no indication that the jury found itself so 
“hopelessly deadlocked” that it could not reach a verdict, and, therefore, declaration of a mi-
strial is an improper remedy). 
116 Id. at 380. 
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of eventually reaching a verdict, and that the trial judge allowed them 
an insufficient amount of time to render a decision.117  Therefore, “as 
a matter of law,” the defendant could not be subjected to reprosecu-
tion of the matter.118 
In People v. Adames,119 a unique procedural situation pre-
sented itself regarding the defense‟s request for a mistrial due to pro-
secutorial misconduct.120  At trial, the prosecution was admonished 
for improperly questioning the defendant and co-defendant, and, 
when it continued to happen, the defense counsel motioned for mi-
strial.121  At that time, the trial judge “reserved decision [on the mo-
tion]” and allowed the trial to continue.122  Upon the jury‟s rendering 
of a guilty verdict, the trial judge chose to then decide upon the mi-
strial motion, and ultimately vacated the verdict.123 
Upon review by the Court of Appeals, the court considered 
whether it should adopt a new standard that retrial should be barred in 
situations where “the case proceeded to verdict before the selected 
jury, [and where] the trial conduct of the prosecutors is grossly and 
fundamentally prejudicial to defendant‟s fair trial rights.”124  A un-
animous court held that, in matters such as this, the court should not 
“depart from the general analytical mode for deciding such cases,” as 
established in the Kennedy holding.125  Furthermore, the vacatur, as 
issued by the trial court judge, was a similar sort of relief as would be 
granted by an appellate court, and therefore, cannot be viewed as a 
bar to retrial.126 
The Court of Appeals also addressed whether mistrial, and 
subsequent retrial, is the appropriate remedy to prosecutorial miscon-
 
117 Baptiste, 530 N.E.2d at 380. 
118 Id. at 381 (emphasizing that the jurors were not afforded a sufficient amount of time to 
properly deliberate on the case). 
119 629 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1983). 
120 Id. at 392. 
121 Id. (stating that the prosecution‟s badgering of the defendants in regards to their police 
interviews was improper). 
122 Id. at 392-93. 
123 Id. at 393 (stating that the defendant was convicted at his retrial and appealed to the 
First Department, which rejected his double jeopardy claim and affirmed defendant‟s convic-
tion). 
124 Adames, 629 N.E.2d at 393. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 394 (“In such instances [as this case], the double jeopardy bar to retrial should 
not attach and the correct and proportionate remedy should allow for retrial.”). 
14
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duct at the original trial in Gorghan v. DeAngelis.127  At trial, the 
prosecution continuously mentioned “evidence of petitioner‟s prior 
uncharged criminal and immoral acts” previously deemed inadmissi-
ble.128  Defense motioned for a mistrial several times, which were de-
nied by the court, and the defendant was subsequently found guilty 
on all charges.129 
The defendant, following the Appellate Division‟s reversal of 
the conviction and remand for a new trial, petitioned the court in or-
der to bar retrial on the grounds of double jeopardy, which was de-
nied by the Appellate Division, Third Department.130  The appellate 
court determined that the actions taken by the prosecution were made 
in order to “secur[e] a conviction, not . . . to provoke defendant into 
moving for a mistrial.”131  The Court of Appeals, in maintaining its 
view in Adames, affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, and 
stated that a new trial is a sufficient remedy for matters where “de-
fendants suffer both prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct . . . and er-
roneous denial of a mistrial motion.”132 
The Matter of Rivera v. Firetog133 presented the Court of Ap-
peals with the question of whether a judge must ask the jury whether 
it had reached a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial on the 
grounds of jury deadlock.134  At trial, the jury was presented with 
three counts on which to render a verdict, with instructions that each 
of the latter counts should not be considered if the jury found the de-
fendant to be guilty of the higher charge.135  Deliberations continued 
for days, prompting the judge to ask if the jury had reached a verdict 
on any of the charges, to which the defendant‟s counsel “countered 
that there was some indication that the jury had progressed past the 
first count and requested the court to inquire about the possibility of a 
 
127 857 N.E.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. 2006). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 524-25 (stating that, on appeal from the county court, the Appellate Division de-
termined that the proper remedy to the misconduct of the prosecution would be a new trial 
and remitted to the lower court). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (quoting Gorghan v. DeAngelis, 808 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 
2006)). 
132 Gorghan, 857 N.E.2d at 525-26. 
133 900 N.E.2d 952 (N.Y. 2008). 
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partial verdict.”136  The judge did not inquire about partial verdict and 
deliberations continued.137  Mistrial was eventually declared because 
no verdict was reached and the defendant subsequently “filed a writ-
ten motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.”138 
In reviewing the appeal of the granted motion, the Court of 
Appeals ultimately reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division 
and dismissed the petition.139  In delivering the majority opinion, the 
court examined this case‟s relationship to People v. Baptiste and Ari-
zona v. Washington, in which the Court of Appeals determined that a 
mistrial on the grounds of a jury deadlock is to “involve[ ] the exer-
cise of judicial discretion.”140  The Court of Appeals held that the trial 
judge acted with reasonable discretion when he declared a mistrial on 
the basis of the three jury deadlock notes he received.141 
 
IV. COMPARING FEDERAL AND STATE APPROACHES TO DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY AND REPROSECUTION 
The federal court and the courts of New York have taken a 
similar approach to issues involving protection of a defendant from 
double jeopardy.  In determining whether retrial would violate a de-
fendant‟s due process rights under the Constitution, the federal judi-
ciary has consistently deferred to the seminal doctrine as set forth in 
Perez.  Perez‟s holding that a “manifest necessity” need be present in 
order for the bar to retrial to be done away with is consistently reite-
rated throughout its progeny.142 
 
136 Id. at 954. 
137 Id.  The prosecution requested a mistrial on the basis of a continuance of jury dead-
locks.  In response, the defense requested that the judge yet again check for a partial verdict, 
which the judge declined doing, since the jury made no statement declaring that it had 
reached one.  Rivera, 900 N.E.2d at 954. 
138 Id. (stating that the motion was granted by the Appellate Division, and subsequently 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals). 
139 Id. at 955. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 956; Rivera, 900 N.E.2d at 958-59 (Pigott, J., dissenting) (stating that defense 
counsel‟s argument that the trial court had a duty to inquire as to a partial verdict was cor-
rect, especially if there was a chance that the jury did not know it could return such a ver-
dict). 
142 Perez, 22 U.S. at 580 (“We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested 
Courts . . . with the authority to discharge a jury . . . whenever . . . there is a manifest neces-
sity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”). 
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The cases on double jeopardy heard by the Supreme Court af-
ter Perez have interpreted the meaning of “manifest necessity.”  The 
Court in Washington determined that Justice Story‟s “necessity” 
could not be read literally, but rather, it meant that there is a lofty 
burden that must be met by the prosecution to show that mistrial and 
subsequent retrial is the appropriate remedy for the issue at bar.143  
Through its application of this standard, the Court has predominantly 
held in favor of retrial in the majority of cases regarding double jeo-
pardy.144  Unless an egregious abuse of discretion has been exercised 
by a trial judge as in Downum, the Supreme Court has been reluctant 
to hold that retrial would be barred by the Fifth Amendment.145 
The courts of New York State have followed a similar pattern 
to that of the Supreme Court regarding the barring of reprosecution of 
the defendant under Article I, Section Six of the state constitution.  A 
majority of the mistrial declarations in lower courts that have been 
appealed to the Court of Appeals have resulted from what is claimed 
to be an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge.  The 
Court of Appeals in Michael, while not directly stating so, seems to 
focus more on Justice Story‟s latter words in the Court‟s opinion in 
Perez: 
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; 
and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, 
which would render it proper to interfere.  To be sure, 
the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, 
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and 
obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts 
should be extremely careful how they interfere with 




143 Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 (“[I]t is manifest that the key word „necessity‟ cannot be 
interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are 
degrees of necessity and we require a “high degree” before concluding that a mistrial is ap-
propriate.”). 
144 See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667; Washington, 434 U.S. 497; Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600. 
145 Downum, 372 U.S. at 738 (“We resolve any doubt „in favor of the liberty of the citizen, 
rather than exercise what would be an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial              
discretion.‟ ”). 
146 Michael, 394 N.E.2d at 1138 (emphasis added) (referring to Perez, 22 U.S. at 580). 
17
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The discretion of the trial judge is to determine “whether a mistrial is 
necessary,” not just convenient or one of a number of potential op-
tions.147  In many of the cases composing Michael’s progeny, the 
Court of Appeals has given deference to the actions of the trial judge, 
and determined that they had not abused their discretion in declaring 
a mistrial and subsequent retrial.148 
The holdings of Baptiste and, more recently, Robar, have 
marked a deviation from the traditional approach of the New York 
courts to cases involving double jeopardy as a bar to reprosecution.149  
The Court of Appeals in Baptiste, and the Third Department in Robar 
both determined that the trial judges abused their discretion in declar-
ing mistrials, and that reprosecution is barred by both the New York 
and United States Constitutions.150  The majority of New York State 
court decisions have held otherwise, finding that “manifest necessity” 
existed and favoring retrial of the defendant.151 
 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND VALUE OF ROBAR V. LABUDA 
The decision in Robar v. LaBuda is a triumph for supporters 
of a strict interpretation of the both the United States Constitution and 
the New York State Constitution.  Both constitutions provide for a 
protection of an individual from being placed in jeopardy twice for 
the same offense.152  While the court in Robar is respectful of and 
compliant with binding judicial precedent, it is also mindful of the 
implications if it were to permit reprosecution of a defendant.  By al-
lowing the prosecution a second chance to convict after the court fails 
to act in a procedurally-appropriate manner (in this case, rendering a 
mistrial after reviewing the Batson arguments following the impane-
ling of a jury), the court is, in effect, disregarding the intent of the 
 
147 Id. 
148 See Rivera, 900 N.E.2d 952; Gorghan, 857 N.E.2d 523; Adames, 629 N.E.2d 391; 
Enright, 451 N.E.2d 176. 
149 See Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (stating that where “[a] mistrial [is] not [a] necessary” 
remedy to an issue at trial, “retrial . . . is barred” by the state and federal constitutions); Bap-
tiste, 530 N.E.2d at 381 (stating that, “as a matter of law,” reprosecution is an inappropriate 
remedy where a true abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge can be shown). 
150 Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 720; Baptiste, 530 N.E.2d at 381. 
151 See Rivera, 900 N.E.2d 952; Gorghan, 857 N.E.2d 523; Adames, 629 N.E.2d 391; 
Enright, 451 N.E.2d 176. 
152 U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6. 
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framers of the Constitution, and risks undermining the key principles 
of the United States criminal judicial system. 
The court in Robar arrived at its conclusion in a manner 
which deviates slightly from the course of previous double jeopardy 
cases, further enhancing the protections given to the accused.  While 
focusing on the same seminal “manifest necessity” doctrine as fol-
lowed by its predecessors, the court in Robar promotes a much more 
stringent interpretation of Justice Story‟s hallowed words: “The pow-
er [to discharge a jury or to reprosecute] ought to be used with the 
greatest caution.”153  The holding in this case may mark the point 
where the Third Department differs slightly from the other courts of 
New York and the federal courts, by focusing less on trying to stretch 
or interpret the trial record in favor of retrial, and more on the civil 
liberties and rights of the accused.154  Recently, the other appellate 
departments of New York have all taken pro-retrial stances in their 
findings of “manifest necessity” in cases regarding mistrials and 
double jeopardy.155  The Third Department‟s decision in Robar re-
mains a singular beacon in the state appellate courts for greater judi-
cial deference to a defendant‟s constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy. 
The Robar decision is also a refreshing ruling in an era where 
the fundamental rights of the citizens of the United States have be-
come somewhat limited in favor of national security.  Through acts of 
law, such as the USA PATRIOT ACT,156 Congress has granted gov-
ernment bodies the ability to overreach certain constitutional limita-
tions and protections in order to prevent or protect against terrorist 
acts.  While seemingly unrelated to double jeopardy as mentioned in 
Robar and its antecedents, it demonstrates a willingness of the legis-
lative arm of the United States to overstep clearly spelled-out protec-
tions of individual rights under the Constitution.  Decisions, like that 
 
153 Perez, 22 U.S. at 580. 
154 See Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 718 n.5 (emphasis in original) (“[I]t is not the role of a re-
viewing court to „search the record‟ to decipher an alternative ground that we are convinced 
would have supported a mistrial.”). 
155 See, e.g., People v. Pearson, 911 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (App. Div 2d Dep‟t 2010); Marte 
v. Berkman, 895 N.Y.S.2d 376 (App. Div 1st Dep‟t 2010); People v. Hernandez, 849 
N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2007). 
156 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). 
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of Robar, demonstrate the judicial branch‟s dedication to maintaining 
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